In many learning problems, agents cannot design their information in a completely flexible way. Instead, they choose from a given, finite (though often large) set of information sources. For instance, a researcher studying the genetic determinants of depression cannot, at any cost, access an arbitrarily precise signal about the magnitude of this effect. He can, however, acquire many kinds of information related to it; for example, he might obtain neurochemical and genetic data, or analyze the incidence of depression in different groups.
kind of information, as opposed to the more frequently studied frictions that emerge from inference. We assume that each agent takes an action based on all information acquired up to (and including) himself, and maximizes a private objective that depends only on his action and the payoff-relevant state. We work with normal signals, which gives the additional tractability that signal choices depend only on the history of acquisitions, but not the history of signal realizations: the information choice that maximizes payoffs for each agent will be the one that maximizes that period's reduction of uncertainty about the payoff-relevant state.
Our focus is on informationally overabundant settings, in which some kinds of information are redundant. Formally, agents can completely learn the payoff-relevant state from various (proper) subsets of signals. As a benchmark, we first derive the optimal long-run frequency of signal acquisitions, corresponding to the choices that maximize speed of information revelation about the payoff-relevant state.
We then show that whether society's acquisitions converge to this optimal long-run frequency depends critically on how many signals are needed to identify this state. The key intuition refers back to an observation made in Sethi and Yildiz [3] : An agent who repeatedly observes a source confounded by an unknown parameter learns both about the payoff-relevant state and also about the confounding term, and hence improves his interpretation of this source over time. In our setting, where a single confounding term can affect multiple sources, there is a further spillover effect: learning from one source helps agents to interpret information from all sources confounded by the same parameters.
Suppose then that there are K unknowns in total (the single payoff-relevant state and K − 1 additional confounding terms), and agents can only recover the payoff-relevant state by observing K sources. Endogenously, agents will observe some K sources and learn not just the payoff-relevant state but also all confounding states. This leads them to eventually evaluate all sources by an "objective" asymptotic criterion, and discover the best set of sources. More formally, we obtain the following result: If K sources are required to recover the payoff-relevant state, then long-run acquisitions are optimal, independently of the prior belief.
In contrast, if it is possible to learn the payoff-relevant state from fewer than K sources, then inefficient long-run learning may obtain. This is because repeated observation of fewer than K information sources will not reveal all of the confounding terms, leading agents to persistently undervalue sources that provide information confounded by the remaining unknowns. Our second main result says that any set of fewer than K sources that recovers the payoff-relevant state is a "learning trap" under some prior beliefs. We further show that the long-run inefficiency under a learning trap-measured as the ratio of the optimal speed of learning to the achieved speed of learning-can be arbitrarily large.
